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THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
"CRISIS": THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF DAMAGE LIMITATIONS
During the early 1970's, the legal and medical professions were
faced with an apparent medical malpractice "crisis". 1 State legislatures, perceiving the "crisis" as a potential source of medical cost
inflation, enacted statutes in the mid-1970's to quell this "crisis".,
These legislative efforts included the creation of medical malpractice screening panels,8 limitations on attorney's contingency fees,4
1. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1985) (legislature
enacted malpractice reform measures due to "perceived crisis"); American Bank & Trust
Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 371, 683 P.2d 670, 677, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 678
(1984) (statute a response to insurance "crisis"); Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 273 Ind.
374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 589 (1980) (legislature responding to crisis in health care industry).
But see, e.g., Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399, 417 (1976) (remanded for a factual determination of authenticity of "crisis"), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977). See generally US. DEPARTMENT orF HEALTH EDUCATION AND WEF-ARI, PuB. No. (Os)
73-88, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDWICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) [hereinafter cited as HEW]. The HEW report examined the malpractice climate of the early 1970's
and found no "uniquely identifiable malpractice problem," but a problem consisting of
many social, legal and medical factors. Id. at 4. See also Aitken, Medical Malpr.actice: The
Alleged "Crisis" In Perspective, 3 WST. U.L. REv. 27, 27 (1976) (challenging seriousness of
malpractice crisis); Cunningham and Lane, Malpractice - The Illusory Crisis, 54 FLA. B.J. 114,
115 (1980) (questioning existence of a malpractice crisis); Redish, Legislative Response to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEx. L. REv. 759, 759
(1977) (discussing various state malpractice remedies); Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL L REv. 829, 831 (1979) (discussing the California legislation and its constitutionality).
2. See, e.g., California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) 1975 Cal.
Stats. Ex. Sess. 3949 ch.l. § I (Deering Supp. 1985) (preamble attributed rising malpractice insurance costs to "potential breakdown of the health delivery system"); New Mexico
Medical Malpractice Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-5-13 to -22 (Inter. Supp. 1984) (statute
defined standard of care, restricted lack of informed consent, limited recoveries). See also
infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
3. See Ama. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567 (Supp. 1985). The function of screening panels is
to weed out nonmeritorious claims, resolve claims quickly and encourage settlements. See
Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro
Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARv. J. ON LEits 143, 150 (1981); cf.
Aat. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-567. Screening panels are usually comprised of lawyers, judges,
physicians and nonprofessionals. Learner, supra, at 150. A claimant submits the case to the
panel before or after filing suit and the findings of the panel concerning liability are admissible to the jury. See Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 666 (1977);
Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels" A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 46 FORDHAM L. Rv.
322, 324-27 (1977). The majority of courts faced with a constitutional inquiry have held
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limitation of the collateral source rule' and shortening the relevant statutes of limitation. The most controversial provisions of
the medical malpractice legislation have been those which limit
screening panels valid. See, e.g., DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Memorial Hosp.,
628 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1980) (upheld panel as promoting meaningful settlement):
Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1175 (5th Cir. 1979) (panel constitutional);
Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744, 749 (1977) (panel upheld); Everett v.
Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1271 (La. 1978) (panel upheld as constitutional); Prendergast
v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657,672 (1977) (panel a valid means of review). Some
courts, however, have declared screening panels invalid under state constitutions. See, e.g.,
State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Memorial Hosp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo.
1979) (limited access to courts violates state constitution); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa.
385, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (1980) (panels violate state constitution). The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Mattos found that the panels had actually delayed claims. See id.
4. See CAL Bus & PROF. CODE § 6146 (Deering Supp. 1985). California limits contingency fees to 40% of the first $50,000 recovered; one-third of the second $50,000 recovered; 25% of the next $100,000 recovered; and 10% of any amount of recovery which
exceeds $200,000. Id. The Supreme Court of California has upheld this provision, and the
U.S. Supreme Court has recently dismissed an appeal on the case. See Roa v. Lodi Medical
Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 172, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, 85 (1985), appeal
dismissed, 54 U.S.L.W. 3344 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1985) (No. 85-216). Some states which have
limited contingency fees have set ceilings on the percentage an attorney may collect. See ch.
294, § 15 [1985] N.Y. Laws 726-27 (standard one-third arrangement in New York is replaced by a sliding scale recovery); HEW, supra note 1, at 32-35. With the contingency fee
arrangement a claimant can obtain legal counsel for little or no charge if the case is decided against him, and if he wins, the contingent fee may range between one-third and
one-half of the total recovery. Id. at 32.
5. See, e.g., CAL CiV. CODE § 3333.1 (Deering 1984). The California statute allows the
defendant in a personal injury action to introduce evidence that the plaintiff will receive
money from another source to compensate for his injury. See id. This provision of California's malpractice act has been held constitutional. See Barme v. Wood, 37 Cal. 3d 174, 689
P.2d 446, 451, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816, 821 (1984). See generally M. MCCAFFERTV & S. MEYER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTCE BAsEs OF LIABILrY 139 (1985) (discussing changes in collateral
source rule); Redish, supra note 1, at 763-64 (discussing state approaches to the collateral
source rule).
6.

See, e.g., CAL CIV. PRoc. CODE § 340.5 (Deering Supp. 1985) (three-year limit); FLA.

STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (4)(b) (West 1982) (two-year discovery rule with maximum of four
years, absent fraud or collusion); IND. CODE § 16-9.5-3-1 (1976) (two-year limit). The statute
of limitations in medical malpractice actions generally does not begin to run until the victim discovers or should have discovered his injury. See HEW, supra note 1,at 30. State
legislatures modified this rule setting outside limits on when an action may be brought. See
CAL CIV. PRoc CODE § 340.50 (Deering Supp. 1985); Ft.A STAT. ANN. § 95.11 (4)(b) (West
1982); B. WEtTHMANN, MEDICAL MALPRACTnc

LAW: How MEDICINE IS CHANGING THE LAW

145-50 (1984). The shorter limitations have been held constitutional in some state courts.
Sae, e.g., Anderson v. Wagner, 79 I1. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560, 567 (1979) (upholding Illinois two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions); Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 604 (1980) (upheld Indiana's two-year limit). But see,
e.g., Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d 961, 979 (1984) (abolition of discovery
rule violates equal protection); Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41, 44 (Colo. 1984) (three-year
limit violates state constitution); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 95, 424 A.2d 825, 833 (1980)
(statute of limitations struck down as being "manifestly unfair").
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damages for malpractice victims.' These damage "caps" either
limit the total recovery an injured malpractice plantiff can be
awarded,8 or place ceilings on noneconomic damages such as pain
and suffering.' The damage caps have been challenged as violative
of the fourteenth amendment's Eiual Protection Clause10 on the
ground that separating medical malpractice victims from other
tort or personal injury plantiffs is disciiminatory.11 In the most
recent decisions in this area, Hoffman v. United States"' and Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group,"' the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
7. See, e.g., CAL CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 1984) (limiting non-economic loss to
$250,000): IND. CODE § 16-9.5-2-2 (1976) ($500,000 limit on total recovery). See generally
Keith, The Texas Medical and Liability and InsuranceAt - A Survey and Analysis of its History,
Construction and Constitutionality, 36 BAYLOR L REv. 265, 327-31 (1984) (discussing state

and federal constitutional ramifications); Learner, supra note 3, at 149 (discussing range of
limitations from state to state).
8. See, e.g., NEa. REv. STAT. § 44-2825 (1984) (total recovery limit of $500,000 before
Dec. 31, 1984 and $1,000,000 afterwards); ND. CENT. CODE § 26-40-11 (1978) ($1,000,000
maximum recovery); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.43 (Page 1981) (limit of $200,000 recovery when death not involved).

9. See CAL CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (Deering 1984). The California provision states: "[T]he
injured plaintiff shall be entitled to recover noneconomic losses to compensate for pain,
suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement and other nonpecuniary damage [but in] no action shall the amount of damages for noneconomic losses exceed two
hundred fifty thousand dollars ($250,000)." Id.
10. See US. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment provides, in part, that
"No state shall . . . deny to any persons within its jurisdictions the equal protection of its
laws." Id. See infra notes 37-65 and accompanying text.
11. See id.; Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 95, 424 A.2d 825, 835 (1980). The Constitution requires that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated, but it does not demand absolute equality. See F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920);
Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. REv. 489, 490
(1977); Harper, Which Equal ProtectionStandardfor Medical Malpractice Legislation?, 8 HAsTINGS CoNs'r. LQ. 125, 131-38 (1981); Tussman and Tenbroek, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CAL L. Rxv. 341, 34344 (1949); Note, A Constitutional Perspective on the Indiana
Medical Malpractice Act, 51 IND. L.J. 143, 163 (1975); COmment, Recent Medical Malpractice
Legislation - A FirstCheck Up, 50 TUL L REv. 655, 667-70 (1976). Medical malpractice plaintiffs have been discriminated against in two ways under recovery caps: first, they are
treated differently from other tort or personal injury plaintiffs, and, second, they are
treated differently depending on whether their injuries are valued above or below the statutory limit. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 830.
12. 767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985). The plaintiff in Hoffman suffered brain damage as a
result of the negligent administration of anesthetic. Id. at 1433. The district court entered
judgment for the plaintiff for $3,179,100 in economic damages and $1,000,000 in
noneconomic damages, holding California's cap unconstitutional. Id. The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the provision constitutional and limiting the recovery for noneconomic damages to $250,000. Id. at 1437.
13. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985), appeal dismissed, U.S. 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985). In Fein, the plaintiff was injured by the defendant's failure to diagnose an impending heart attack. 695 P.2d at 669, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 373. The
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Circuit and the Supreme Court of California,1 4 respectively, have
upheld the medical malpractice damages caps.
It is submitted, however, that both Hoffman and Fein were
wrongly decided, and that the malpractice caps do unconstitutionally discriminate against medical malpractice victims. This article
will suggest a more correct constitutional analysis of the legislation by first examining the medical malpractice "crisis" that has
spurred recovery limitation legislation. It will then consider and
recommend the proper level of scrutiny for equal protection challenges in the area, and analyze the legislation accordingly. Finally,
the article will discuss the implications and ramifications of the Supreme Court's recent dismissal on appeal of the Fein case.
I.

THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS

Any analysis of the validity of malpractice legislation must begin
with an examination of the reasons for which it was passed."
There indeed was a substantial increase in the number of malpractice actions filed in the late 1960's and early 1970's. 6 In Northern
California, for example, the number of claims more than doubled
from 11.8 per 100 physicians in 1968 to 25 per 100 physicians in
1974.17 The reason for the increase, and whether it reached crisis
jury found for the plaintiff in the amount of $24,733 for wages lost during the trial,
$63,000 for future medical expenses, $700,000 for lost future wages, and $500,000 damages for pain and suffering. 695 P.2d at 670, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 373. The trial court modified the pain and suffering judgment in accordance with the California Civil Code, 695
P.2d at 671, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 374, and the decision was affirmed by the California Supreme Court. 695 P.2d at 686, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
14. Hoffwman, 767 F.2d at 1436; Fein, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 386. In upholding the cap's constitutionality, the courts concluded that the classifications of malpractice
victims were rationally related to a legitimate state interest in stemming the medical malpractice crisis. Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1435; Fein, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
15. See Harper, supra note 11, at 127-30.
16. See HEW. supra note 1, at 6-12; P. DANzoN, TIHE FREQuENcy AND SEvEArrY oF MEDICAL MALPRACCE CLAIMS 4-9 (1982). The largest medical malpractice insurance company
in the U.S. reported that in 1969 it received one claim for every 23 doctors it insured, and
that by 1974 the ratio had risen to one in every ten, representing a 139% rise in claim
incidence. See Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 36 MD. L. REV.
489, 490 n.3 (1977). See also Note, Medical Malpractice - Constitutionalityof Limits of Liability,

78 W. VA. L Rav. 381, 383 (1976) (40% increase in claims between 1965 and 1975). Between 1967 and 1977, however, there was not only an increase in medical malpractice
litigation but in all civil litigation filed in district courts. See ADMINISTRATnVE OFFcIE OF THE
US. COURTS A PICTORIAL SUMMARY 12 (Wash. D.C. 1977).
17. See Keene, California'sMedical Malpractice Crisis, in A LEISLArtuRE's GUIDE TO THE
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proportions, however, has been debated." Physicians and insurance companies argued that the increase in actions resulted from
attorneys' encouragment of non-meritorious claims,"s and media
coverage of malpractice suits,s 0 since the increase in actions was
accompanied by larger jury verdicts.21 Those who believed that
the crisis was greatly exaggerated argued that the increase in
claims filed was caused by increased medical negligence,"2 and decreased confidence in doctors." Commentators have accused insurance companies of creating the panic as an excuse for raising
malpractice premiums to compensate for their bad investments.'"
27, 27 (Warren & Merritt ed. 1976).
18. See HEW. supra note 1. at 27-37 (no one cause for the crisis); Aitken, supra note 1,
at 30; Blaut, The Medical Malpractice Crisis - Its Causes and Future, 44 INS,COUNS. J. 114, 115
(1977); Note, supra note 1, at 848-53.
19. Set Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified
Medical Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAm L Rev. 1003, 1004 (1977). But see HEW, supra
note 1, at 32-34 (physicians overemphasizing influence of contingency system upon malpractice actions).
20. See Byrnes, The Media and Medical Malpractice in HEW, supra note 1, at 653-57. The
media can magnify the medical malpractice problem in a way that is unfavorable towards
the physician and the quality of health care in general. HEW, supra note 1, at 18.
21. See HEW, supra note 1, at 10. In California, for example, the average claim in 1969
was $5000, but in 1975 it increased to $12,000. See Mill, Malpractice Litigation Are Solutions
in Sight?, 232 J. AMA 359, 361 (1975). In California there has also been an increase in
awards over $300,000. See Waxman, Spiraling Costs A Health Care Slide, 11 TIAL 23, 25
(May/June 1975). In 1969 there were three such awards and in 1974, there were 24. Id. at
25. Physicians have maintained that large jury awards are attributable, in part, to juries'
inability to understand complex medical cases, and to members' sympathetic reactions to
injured plaintiffs. See R. Gom THE TRunT AouTr MDicAi. MAuAcIcz 121-74 (1975).
22. See HEW, supra note 1, at 51-65; Wolfe, Medical Malpractice:A Consumer RepresentaMAu.PRAcnCz Issue

tim's View, in ThI LzIrAmuateUs Gum,, To TH MAImtpAcncz Issuz 73, 74 (Warren & Mer-

ritt ed. 1976); Note, supra note 1, at 851 n.127.
23. See HEW, supra note 1, at 67-81. A suit may result from a lack of communication
and a breakdown of the doctor-patient relationship. Id at 68.
24. See Aitken, supra note I, at 34-35; Baldwin, The Phony Medical Malpractice Crisis, 21
Trat. 4. 4 (Apr. 1985); Oster, Medical Malpractice Insurance, 45 lIs. CouNi J. 228, 231
(1978). Insurance companies have been accused of underwriting losses when determining
malpractice rates. See Baldwin, supra, at 4. The insurance companies exaggerated future
predicted claims which became the basis for the "losses" and then increased rates. Id. Between 1960 and 1970 premiums for physicians rose 540.8% and for surgeons 942.2%. See
HEW, supra note 1, at 13. Faced with these higher premiums physicians began to practice
defensive medicine. See HEW, supra note I, at 14. In practicing defensive medicine, the
physician takes extra precautions, resulting in higher medical care costs for the patient. See
Note, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DuKe LJ. 939, 942
& n.6. There were claims that physicians were also being faced with the unavailability of
insurance. See, e.g., St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm'r, 339 A.2d 291,
300 (Md. 1975) (upheld insurance company's right to withdraw from the medical malpractice market); Oregon Medical Ass'n v. Rawls, No. 421-429, slip op. at 1 (Or. Cir. Ct. May
4, 1976) (medical malpractice insurance carriers decreased from 85 to five), rev'd on other
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It is suggested that despite the arguments of those who disputed
that the crisis existed, physicians and insurance companies were
successful in pressuring state legislatures to react to the perceived
malpractice insurance crisis. Between 1975 and 1977, forty-nine
states enacted legislation aimed at stabilizing medical insurance
markets . Generally, legislation has been directed at three areas:
the medical profession,2 the insurance industry," and the tort
system. 8 Only a few states passed statutes affecting physicians directly, and these statutes largely changed the jurisdiction of health
care licensing agencies." In the insurance industry, the most common response was the creation of Joint Underwriting Associations
(JUA's)89 JUA's were designed to force insurance companies into
providing malpractice insurance and to pool losses.31
California enacted a comprehensive statute in 1975 to stem the
so-called crisis."' In the California statute, the tort system of recovery received the greatest attention by the legislature, and a
major provision included a limitation on recovery for noneconomic losses." The California courts, as well as courts in a
grounds, 276 Or. 1101, 557 P.2d 664 (1976). As of May 1975, the Argonaut Company
cancelled policies of large numbers of doctors in New York and did not renew some 4000
California policies. See Taylor & Shields, The Limitation on Recovery in Medical Negligence
Cases in Virginia, 16 U. RicH. L Riv. 799, 807 (1982). But see Aitken, supra note 1, at 29-30
(average doctor paid proportionately less of his income for malpractice insurance than average citizen does for car insurance). See also Goddard, The American Medical Association is
Wrong - There is No Medical Malpractice Crisis, Los Angeles Daily Journal, May 17, 1985, at
S 16, col. 2. (average American physician pays about 2.9% of income for malpractice
insurance).
25. See, e.g.. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.530 (1973); Ft.*. STAT. ANN. § 627.357 (West. 1984).
State responses varied, with some states enacting all-encompassing statutes while others enacted statutes designed to deal with the specific problem. See Grossman, An Analysis of 1975
Legislation Relating to Medical Malpractice, in A LMISATuE's GUIDE To TH MALPRACICE
ISSUE 1, 1-10 (Warren & Merritt ed. 1976).
26. See CAL Bus. & PROF. CoDEz § 2123 (Deering Supp. 1985).
27. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.35(4) (West. 1984); IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 519A.1-.13 (West
Supp. 1985).
28. See supra notes 3-7.
29. See CAL Bus, & PROF. CODE § 2100 (Deering Supp. 1985). The licensing agency was
changed from the Board of Medical Examiners to the Board of Medical Quality Assurance.
Id. § 2100.2. Its responsibilities included reviewing the quality of medical practice carried
out by physicians and surgeons, as well as administering and handling disciplinary actions.

Id.

§ 2100.6.

30.
31.
32.
33.

See, e.g., CAL INS. CODE §§ 11890, 11895-11900 (West 1976) (repealed 1980).
See Grossman, supra note 25, at 3, 4.
See supra note 2.
CAL Crv. CODE § 3333.2 (limiting recovery to $250,000 for noneconomic damages);
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number of other states with similar statutes, were asked to determine the constitutionality of this legislation." Unlike California,
the legislation has been found unconstitutional in several states."
In examining the legislation, courts have differed on the standard
of review to apply, a confusion which has led to the differing
results."
II.

EQUAL

PROTECTION ANALYSIS

Medical malpractice damages caps create a classification of
plaintiffs based on the incidence of malpractice for equal protection analysis purposes.87 The majority of courts, including the California courts, that have reviewed the malpractice damage limitations have not used a strict scrutiny analysis on this classification,"
reasoning that the right to recover in a tort action is not fundamental" and that medical malpractice plaintiffs are not a suspect
CAL Civ. CoDz

§

3333.1 (change in collateral source rule); CAL Bus & PROF. CODE

§

6146

(changing the contingency fee arrangement).
34. Ser, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d at 1435 (sole issue on appeal is constitutional validity of damages cap); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 829 (plaintiffs challenge
constitutional validity of the medical malpractice statute); Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 695 P.2d at 697, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (deciding constitutionality of damages
limitation).
35. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass'n, 63 11. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736,
741-43 (1976) (held damages cap unconstitutional under Illinois state constitution); Carson
v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 836-37 (damages limitation unconstitutional under both state and
federal constitutions).
36. Compare Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1435, Fein, 695 P.2d at 686, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 387,
and Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 595 (1980) (used rational basis test) with Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 832, and Arneson v. Olson. 270
N.W.2d 125. 133 (N.D. 1978) (used intermediate scrutiny).
37. See Carson, 424 A.2d at 830. The damages cap legislation classifies plaintiffs differently from both other tort plaintiffs and other medical malpractice plaintiffs. Id. See gerally Kovnat, Medical Malpractice L%gislation in New Mexico, 7 N.M.L Rzv. 1,25 (1977); Note,
supra note 1, at 841.
38. Se. infra notes 39-40. In a strict scrutiny analysis, the challenged legislation must
serve a compelling state interest and it must be narrowly drawn to achieve this interest. See
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); J. NowAx, R1 ROTUNDA, & J. YoUNc,
CoNnarvrwNs

LAw 591 (3rd ed. 1983). Under the strict scrutiny analysis the legislation

will almost always be found unconstitutional. See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term
Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine On a Changing Court; A Model For a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L Rev. 1, 8 (strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, fatal in fact"). The
Supreme Court has rarely upheld the constitutionality of legislation under the strict scrutiny test. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (upheld internment of
people of Japanese ancestry during World War II).
39. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d at 1435 ("right to recovery of tort
damages is not a fundamental right"); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555
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classification. 40 Instead, they have applied either a rational basis or
intermediate scrutiny analysis to the legislation."
The California courts, and others which have applied the rational basis test, have typically found malpractice damages caps
constitutionally valid." One court in holding a cap constitutional
reasoned that, "[i]t is enough that the state's action be rationally
based, ' ""4and that there is a rational relationship between the legislation and the desired effect of reducing malpractice insurance
premiums." It is suggested that recovery limitations may be unconstitutional even if the rational basis test is applied. The question to be asked is whether the legislative response to the so-called
P.2d 399, 410 (1976) (no fundamental right in medical malpractice actions), ceL denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977). See generally Redish, supra note 1, at 771. A fundamental right has
been characterized as a right that is "explicitly or implicity guaranteed by the Constitution." See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,33-34 (1973). Fundamental rights include the free exercise of religion, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410
(1963), the right to vote, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966),
and the right to interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969).
40. Se, e.g., Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1435 (medical malpractice plaintiffs are not suspect
class); Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585, 596-97 (1980) (medical malpractice plaintiffs not suspect classification); Carson, 424 A.2d at 829 (none of the
classifications in legislation are suspect). But see Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316,
343 N.E.2d 832, 834 (1976) (medical malpractice act must be justified by a "compelling
state interest"); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976)
(right to seek full compensation fundamental). Classifications are considered suspect when
"[t]he class is... saddled with such disabilities or subjected to a history of such purposeful,
unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Indep.
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). Suspect classifications have included race,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967), McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92
(1964), national origin, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 644-46 (1948), Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943), and alienage, Gram v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,
372 (1971).
41. See infra notes 42-44 and 64-68.
42. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d at 1431 (California legislature had
"plausible reason" to believe recovery limits would stem malpractice insurance crisis); Fein
v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (damages cap rationally related to objective of reducing malpractice insurance costs), appeal dismissed,
U.S. 106 S. Ct. 214; Johnson v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 404 N.E. 2d at 599 (limitation
on recovery bears rational relation to preserving health care); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of La. State Univ. 462 So. 2d 149, 156 (La. 1985) (rational relation exists for damage
limitation); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d at 662 (finding legislative enactment rationally related to continued availability of health care). All legislation must pass the minimum scrutiny test, but, unlike the strict scrutiny approach, legislation reviewed under a
rational basis test will almost always pass constitutional muster. See Mc Gowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961); Gunther, supra note 38, at 8.
43. Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d at 668.
44. Id.
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medical malpractice crisis was reasonable in light of the fact that
the evidence of a crisis was often contradictory or unsubstantiated." Commentators questioning the crisis have suggested that
physicians' claims of astronomical insurance premiums were exaggerated." They have also asserted that there was never any
shortage of quality medical care.'
It is also submitted, however, that the rational basis analysis
should not be applied in the constitutional review of damages
caps. A state may have a legitimate interest in reducing medical
malpractice insurance premiums," but this interest must be balanced against the rights of the medical malpractice plaintiffs."
These plaintiffs are politically powerless compared with the physicians and insurance carriers supporting malpractice legislation and
as such should be protected against discrimination." Their rights
to full compensation for tortious injury, although not fundamental, approach a fundamental level requiring a higher scrutiny than
the rational basis analysis. 1 It is submitted that limiting the compensation a medical malpractice plaintiff can receive is analogous
to a deprivation of property without due process." Courts have
upheld the statutory modification of this common law right of
45. See Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d at 411-16, Boucher v. Sayeed, 459
A.2d 87, 92 (R.I. 1983). The court in Jones found no data that there was a malpractice
insurance crisis in Idaho. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 555 P.2d at 412. The case was
remanded for a factual determination of the extent of a crisis. 555 P.2d at 414-15. In
Boucher, the court applied a rational basis test, deciding that since there was no longer a
medical malpractice crisis the legislation was not rationally related to stemming any crisis.
Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d at 92. It is suggested, therefore, that state legislatures may
have acted hastily in enacting damages limitations without looking deeper into the
problems of the medical malpractice insurance industry.
46. See supra note 25.
47. See Kelner and Kelner, Medical Malpractice.:Is There A Crisis?, 191 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1984).
In New York between 1974 and 1983 there was a 25% increase in the number of physicians despite a decrease in the overall population. Id.
48. See Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d at 1435.
49. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 831.
50. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1. 28 (1973); United
States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (dictum). Justice Stone stated in
Carolene Products that the inability to seek refuge from discrimination may render a class
powerless. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
51. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 829. In Carson, the court stated that the right to
recover in tort is an important substantive right although not fundamental. Id.
52. See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973); Manzanares v. Bell, 214 Kan. 589,
522 P.2d 1291, 1300 (1974); Pinnick v. Cleary, 271 N.E.2d 592. 601 (Mass. 1971).
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plaintiffs, 8 but only when a reasonable substitute for the plaintiff
has been provided."
Although the Supreme Court has usually applied the intermediate standard of review to cases involving gender,5" illegitimacy,"
and indigency,57 some state courts have used it when reviewing
malpractice limitations." The Supreme Court has also used the
intermediate scrutiny analysis when an important, but not necessarily fundamental, right was involved." The right to recover
in tort is an important one 0 and medical malpractice plaintiffs
should not be denied this right unless the state can show an important objective for the classification." In reviewing damages
caps under an intermediate review, courts have declared them arbitrary as not having a "fair and substantial" relation to the objective of the legislature and therefore unconstitutional.' These
53. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 84 (1978).
54. d. at 64. The Supreme Court has held that too much regulation may be recognized
as a taking. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415-16 (1922). See a/so Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 110-15 (Penn Central entitled to a
"'reasonable return"). Workman's compensation acts were upheld as an exchange for the
abrogation of commom law benifits. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 41 (1932); New
York Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
55. Set Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 680 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971). The intermediate review standard was first used in gender discrimination cases because the traditional two-tiered approach of equal protection analysis often led to inflexible results. See Gunther, supra note
38, at 8. Under an intermediate scrutiny the classification must be "substantially related"
to an "important governmental objective." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 197. Set also J.
NOWAK,R. ROTUNDA & J. YouNG, supra note 38, at 593.
56. See Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 499 (1976).
57. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
58. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 830. The recovery limitation challenged in Carson was modeled after the California statute, but was found unconstitutional requiring a
"more rigorious judicial scrutiny than a rational basis." ld.The court in Carson also reasoned that the legislation created arbitrary damage limits and thus denied the most seriously injured plaintiffs equal protection. 424 A.2d at 836. In a North Dakota case, the
court required a "close correspondence between the statutory classification and the legislative goals." Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 133 (N.D. 1978).
59. See, e.g., Turner v. Dep't of Employment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 46 (1975) (when basic
human needs involved, legitimate means must meet a higher level); Stanley v. Illinios, 405
U.S. 645. 652 (1972) (father's interest in retaining custody of biological children "important" right); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (license may be essential and therefore requiring heightened scrutiny).
60. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 829.
61. See id. at 830.
62. See id. at 831; Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d at 135-36. The court in Areson
stated that the limitation precluded recovery by those plaintiffs most seriously injured.
Arneson, 270 N.W.2d at 135-36. A Texas court has held the damages limitation unconstitu-
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courts have also found that patients with meritorious claims are
denied adequate compensation due to the recovery limitations."
In Carson v. Maurer," the New Hampshire Supreme Court found
the correlation between limitations placed on malpractice recoveries and reduced malpractice insurance premiums weak." It is
submitted that this intermediate review standard should be used
when determining the constitutionality of damages limitation
legislation.
A. Application of Intermediate Scrutiny
By using the intermediate standard in reviewing Hoffman and
Fein, it is submitted that those courts would have found the provisions of the California statute limiting damages unconstitutional."
It is true that there existed in California an increase in malpractice claims, larger jury awards and thus higher insurance rates.' 7
However, the legislation is arbitrary and unfair because "the actual cost [of not recovering] to many malpractice plaintiffs is simply too high."" Pain and suffering damages may be the only compensation a malpractice plaintiff receives for physical injury or
impairment." In addition, under a damages limitation, it is suggested that the physician who causes the injury is not held responsible for the full extent of his negligence. The important deterrence aspect of tort law is being modified,7 0 and it is submitted
that this will actually foster medical malpractice.
tional because it did not allow adequate compensation to patients with meritorious claims.
See Baptist Hosp. of South East Texas v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984). This court, however, limited its holding to suits against hospitals. Id.
63. Se Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d at 135-36. The objective of the legislation does
not have a close correspondence with the classification because physicians are encouraged
to enter or remain in practice at the expense of the most seriously injured plaintiffs. Id.
64. 120 N.H. 95, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
65. 424 A.2d at 836.
66. See Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1435 (9th Cir. 1985), Fein v.
Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 139, 695 P.2d 665, 670, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368,
U.S. 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
370 (1985), appea dismissed, 67. Sm supra note 24.
68. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d at 836.
69. Sm id. at 837.
70. Se W. Paossma, LAw or Tomrs 899 (3d ed. 1983).
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B. Ramifications of the Dismissal of Fein
The Supreme Court, through its dismissal of the appeal of Fein,
has upheld the application of a minimum standard of review to
damages cap legislation.7 ' Although the Court did not give an
opinion with the dismissal, it is considered to be on the merits of
the case and has precedential value. 7 It has been suggested, that
the caps require a higher scrutiny than rational basis, an issue
which was not addressed by the Court. 7' The majority of states
deciding the issue have declared such legislation unconstitutional, 7 ' while others have not enacted similar legislation for fear
of it being declared unconstitutional.7 ' These states, however,
may decide to implement such limitations in the wake of the Fein
decision, unless they violate individual state constitutions."
The Supreme Court's decision may, in part, have been based on
its decision upholding the Price-Anderson Act. 7 That Act limits
106 S.Ct. 214, 214 (1985).
U.S. 71. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 72. Id. The Fein appeal was an appeal as of right because the California Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the damages cap. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1982). This provision provides that the question of the validity of a state statute will be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. Id. The dismissal in Fein was for "'want of a substantial federal question."
Id. Dismissals of appeals for want of a substantial federal question apply to state court decisions, and have been held to be an adjudication on the merits. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 322, 343-45 (1975). See generally C. WRIGHr, LAW or FEDERAL Couts § 108 (4th ed.
1983); S. WAsBy, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY SYsTEM 154 (2nd ed.

1984); Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary
Docket in the 1970's, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1721-22 (1978). But see J. NowAK, R. ROrTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, supra note 38, at 34-36 (stating that Supreme Court has often used dismissal of
an appeal as a denial of certiorari). It is suggested that since the distinction may be blurred
there remains room for the question of the constitutionality of medical malpractice caps.
106 S. Ct. 214, 214 (1985).
U.S. 73. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 74. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Ass'n., 63 I1. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736,
743 (1976) (damage limitation an unconstitutional denial of equal protection under state
statute); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 95, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (1980) (damage limitation
unconstitutional under both the state and federal constitution); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978) (damage limitation denial of equal protection under the
U.S. Constitution); Baptist Hosp. of Southeast Texas v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 300 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1984) (damage limitation unconstitutional).
75. See HEW, supra note 1,at 33.
76. See, e.g., Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n., 63 III. 2d at 313, 347 N.E.2d at
743. The Supreme Court of Illinois declared the $500,000.00 limitation unconstitutional
under the state constitution stating, "We are of the opinion that limiting recovery only in
malpractice actions ... is arbitrary and constitutes a special law in violation of .... (the]
Constitution." Id.
77. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 64 (1978); Pub.
L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1985)). The Supreme Court in Duke did not decide the constitutional question based on the Equal Protec-
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damages resulting from a nuclear accident and in turn limits the
defenses which may be raised by the power plant operator. 78 In
reviewing that Act, the Court applied a minimum standard, stating that the legislation was rationally related to encouraging the
development of the nuclear power industry." The recovery fund
for nuclear accident victims required by the Act was found to provide a reasonable substitute for the abrogation of the common law
right to bring an action." Under damages limitation legislation,
the medical malpractice plaintiff is provided with no such substitute, leaving him with the potential of being undercompensated
or even uncompensated."
It is also submitted that in deferring the damages limitation issue to the states, the Supreme Court is paving the way for state
legislatures to limit damages in related tort areas. To justify their
actions, states would need only show a legitimate state interest in
limiting litigation." For example, damages limitations have been
proposed in the area of hazardous substances." Toxic waste victims must rely on state common law tort theories when bringing
an action." These compensation schemes have often been criticized as ineffective and arbitrary." It is suggested that if pressure
is placed on them by the various chemical companies, the state
legislatures might consider "capping" damages, as in medical maltion Clause, but based on the Due Process Clause. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. at 93-94. The Act limits liability in a nuclear emergency. Id.

The Court also refused to decide whether the Due Process Clause requires the legislature
to provide a substitute when abrogating common law rights, stating that the Act did this by
providing a prompt guaranteed recovery. Id. at 87-95. It is suggested that the Court's decision was also based on the uniqueness of nuclear energy and the unlikelihood of damages
above the $560,000,000 limit.
78. Sw Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1982)). The Price-Anderson Act limits liability for an owner of a nuclear plant to $560
million. Id. § 2210(c).
79. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. at 59.
80. Id. at 88.
81. See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 835, 836-38.
82. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d at 667, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
83. See Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAui. L. Rv. 555, 561 (1985); Note,
Allocating the Costs of Hazardos Waste Control, 94 H~av. L Rrv. 584, 590 (1980).
84. See Ginsberg and Weiss, Coaon Law Liabilityfor Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9
Hos-rRA L Rav. 859, 874 (1981); Note, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies
for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 12 Rutr.-G.w L REv. 117, 122 (1980).
85. See Soble, A Propsalfor the Administering Compensatioi of Victims of Toxic Substances
Pollu ow A Model Act, 14 Haav. J.oN Leism 683, 703 (1977).
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practice actions. As with medical malpractice plaintiffs, the most
seriously injured toxic tort victims would be left to bear the burden of their injuries."
IV.

CONCLUSION

Damages "caps" have been enacted by state legislatures as a
proposed means of stemming the medical malpractice insurance
"crisis." In dismissing an appeal on this issue, the Supreme Court
is presuming its constitutionality. It is suggested, however, that
damages caps are violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Using
an intermediate scrutiny test, the malpractice legislation is neither
substantially related to nor furthers an important governmental
objective. It is also suggested that even in applying a rational basis
test the laws may be invalid. These limitations place the burden of
full compensation on those least likely to bear it - the seriously
injured plantiffs. Furthermore, they may lead to even more restrictions on the tort victim's ability to recover for his injuries.
Andrea Palazzolo

86.

See Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837.

